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I. Introduction
This Essay on religious conceptions of corporate purpose was
prepared, in part, to commemorate the incredibly rich corporate
law scholarship of Professors Lyman Johnson and David Millon.
Consequently, my reflections on this topic will draw heavily and
primarily from the work of these two outstanding academicians.
As far back as 1986, in what appears to be his second
published piece of scholarship, Lyman Johnson points out the
necessity of confronting the issue of “corporate purpose.”1 An
Aristotelian myself, I heartily subscribe to Professor Johnson’s
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Distance Education, Maurice A.
Deane School of Law, Hofstra University.
1. See Lyman Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are
They For?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781, 788 (1986) [hereinafter Johnson,
Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are They For?] (“Given the turmoil
that takeovers have caused in corporate life and corporate law, it seems
appropriate to reconsider the issue of corporate purpose.”).
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emphasis on purposes, for how else can one assess the goodness of
a thing, or of its conduct, without an appreciation of its teleology?2
As the title suggests, this Essay will examine religious
conceptions of corporate purpose. More specifically, I shall examine
whether a business corporation may, may not, or must have a
religious purpose—as these three perspectives exhaust the various
possibilities. In other words: might a business corporation adopt a
religious purpose at its own discretion? Or, are all business
corporations precluded from adopting a religious purpose by their
very nature? Or, finally, might it be the case that business
corporations invariably have a religious purpose, regardless of
whether this is explicitly recognized or not (by either the
corporation itself or the public at large)?
I will advance the admittedly aggressive position that the
third of these three perspectives is the correct one: that the nature
and purposes of business corporations are unavoidably religious.
In doing so, I seek to respond to Professor Johnson’s call that
“corporate law scholars find creative ways to give greater
prominence to a more organic sensibility, a sensibility emphasizing
in the cultural-business sphere the same appreciation for
sustainable human endeavor now being underscored in the
heightened environmental consciousness.”3
In embarking upon this project, I also take up Professor
Johnson’s call to “re-enchant” corporate law.4 Time and again,
Professor Johnson has urged the necessity of “acknowledging
faith’s importance—even in the workplace.”5 As he has explained,
2. See Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), SPARKNOTES, http://www.sparknotes.com/
philosophy/aristotle/themes.html (last visited May 2, 2017) (“Teleology is the
study of the ends or purposes that things serve, and Aristotle’s emphasis on
teleology has repercussions throughout his philosophy. Aristotle believed that the
best way to understand why things are the way they are is to understand what
purpose they were designed to serve.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
3. Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate
Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215, 2249 (1992) [hereinafter Johnson, Individual
and Collective Sovereignty].
4. See Lyman Johnson, Re-Enchanting the Corporation, 1 WM. & MARY BUS.
L. REV. 83, 105 (2010) (“[T]o re-enchant the corporation (or to acknowledge its
continuing enchantment) is to permit people of faith and spirituality to ground
their work lives on something enduring and transcendent, rather than on
something precarious and fleeting.”).
5. Id. at 106.
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this “permits an emphasis on the forgotten associational elements
of corporateness.”6 For example, the Bible’s “ancient admonition
against ‘serving two masters’ underlies the fiduciary duty of
loyalty in corporate law. And it has much to say about ‘faithfulness’
in general, the core demand of a fiduciary’s loyal behavior.”7 Thus,
a failure to perceive the significant contribution that religious
traditions and perspectives can have on our understanding of the
corporation yields an approach to corporate law that is sapped of
its full potential vibrancy and robustness.
I would go a step further, however, and invoke Fyodor
Dostoyevsky’s observation that “without God, all things are
permitted.”8 In an era characterized by repeated instances of gross
corporate misconduct, coupled with ceaseless calls for greater
corporate responsibility, it seems baffling to omit from the
discussion the phenomenon of religion, which arguably constitutes
the greatest bridle of mankind’s passions and one of the most
important shapers of human behavior.
In this Essay, I will proceed as follows: first, I will define the
term “religion,”9 as this concept is central to our inquiry. Next, I
will observe how the divorce of religion from economics and
business, and how the treatment of business as a wholly secular
undertaking, is a departure from historical norms.10 Thereafter, I
will confront the central question of this Essay and explain why a
corporation’s purpose is invariably religious in nature.11 Finally, I
will conclude with a discussion of the repercussions flowing from
this understanding of corporate purpose.12

6. Id.
7. Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and
Sinners, Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847, 853.
8. The quotation in this or similar forms is commonly attributed to
Dostoevsky, but his actual words, to be completely accurate, were as follows: “If
you were to destroy in mankind the belief in immortality, not only love but every
living force maintaining the life of the world would at once be dried up. Moreover,
then nothing would be immoral, everything would be lawful.” THE YALE BOOK OF
QUOTATIONS 210–11 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006) (quoting THE BROTHERS
KARAMAZOV bk. 2, ch. 6 (1880)).
9. Infra Part II.
10. Infra Part III.
11. Infra Parts IV–V.
12. Infra Part VI.
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II. Religion Defined

Let us begin our examination of religious conceptions of
corporate purpose by defining the term “religious.” “Religious,” as
used here, is an adjective meaning having to do with religion.13
That, of course, only begs the question: what does “religion” mean?
Although it is a question of some debate, it appears as though
the word “religion” stems from the word “religare,” which means
“to bind.”14 Thus, religion means to bind oneself to God (or, in the
case of the ancients, to the gods).15
Now, why would one do that? Why would one bind oneself to
God? Different peoples and different people individually have done
so for different reasons, including: out of fear;16 out of love;17 out of
need;18 or, out of gratitude.19
But let’s dig a little deeper. Out of fear or love of what? Out of
need or gratitude of what? It would seem to be out of concern over
the most basic human desire of all: “happiness” (or its absence).20
And indeed, all religions, as far as I can tell, focus largely on the
issue of human happiness, and provide guidance on how to best
obtain it.21
13. See Religious, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/
religious (last visited May 2, 2017) (defining religious as “of, relating to, or
concerned with religion”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. Religion, THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newadvent.org/
cathen/12738a.htm (last visited May 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
15. See id. (“We are tied to God and bound to Him . . . .”).
16. See id. (“A common theory with the Greek and Roman philosophers,
favoured by a few writers of modern times, is that religion had its origin in
fear . . . .”).
17. See id. (“Thirdly, the love of God for His own sake is a concomitant of the
virtue of religion, being needed for its perfection.”).
18. See id. (“There thus arises in the natural order a sense of dependence on
the Deity, deeply felt need of Divine help.”).
19. See id. (“We have already seen that fear is not the predominating tone
even in lower religions, as is shown by the universal use of rites expressing joy,
hope, and gratitude.”).
20. See id. (“What man aims at in religion is communion with the Deity, in
which he hopes to attain his happiness and perfection.”).
21. See generally April L. Bogle, The Role of Happiness in the World
Religions, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Oct. 17, 2010, 7:55 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/april-l-bogle/dalai-lama-happiness-summit_b_7
64783.html (last updated May 25, 2011) (last visited May 2, 2017) (on file with
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This, however, only presents us with yet another question:
What exactly is happiness? On one end of the spectrum,
“happiness” is conceptualized as revolving around material
prosperity and creature comforts.22 On the other end of the
spectrum happiness is conceptualized as the attainment of moral
goodness—of human virtue and spiritual perfection.23
Regardless of one’s position on the continuum, it should
become quickly apparent, I posit that religion and the corporation
have a lot to do with one another. For what else is the corporation
other than a predominant form by which modern man has
organized himself in his pursuit of happiness? In Western society
at least (and perhaps this holds true for most of the world beyond
as well), it is within the corporate form that most men and women
work, it is from the corporation that men and women satisfy their
myriad desires through purchasing goods and services, and it is in
the corporation that countless individuals invest in order to attain
their financial goals, be that the ability to retire comfortably, pay
for their children’s educations, or simply accumulate wealth. In
short, it is not unfair to say that both religion and the corporation
are focused on the ascertainment of human happiness.
Some may object that whereas religiously pursued happiness
is spiritually oriented, corporately pursued happiness is
economically oriented. I do not believe that such a blanket
statement is sustainable. For it depends upon the religion, the
corporation, and the individual. We’re all familiar with the
“Prosperity Gospel” and Joel Osteen.24 And indeed, for the
ancients, one of the reasons that religion was taken so seriously

the Washington and Lee Law Review).
22. See Religion, CATH. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newadvent.org/
cathen/12738a.htm (last visited May 2, 2017) (“The sum of happiness looked for
is prosperity in the present life and a continuation of the same bodily comforts in
the life to come.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
23. See id. (“In the higher religions, the perfection sought in religion becomes
more intimately associated with moral goodness. In Christianity, the highest of
religions, communion with God implies spiritual perfection of the highest possible
kind . . . .”).
24. See generally Ted Olsen, Joel Osteen vs. Rick Warren on Prosperity
Gospel, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Sept. 14, 2006), http://www.christianitytoday.
com/ct/2006/septemberweb-only/137-41.0.html (last visited May 2, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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was out of concern for very concrete, real-world, mundane (in the
truest sense of the term) priorities.25
On the flip side, to quote Professor Johnson: “Profit is a means,
not an end.”26 Therefore, one’s efforts to increase his or her wealth
via the corporate form (as either an investor or employee or
consumer) may very well be done with an ultimate spiritual
objective in mind. Perhaps the young man is working for Apple in
order to save enough money to finance his seminary education, or
perhaps the widow is investing in Sony in order to leave the most
sizeable bequest possible to her church. Perhaps the rabbi is
purchasing goods from Bed, Bath, and Beyond in order to make his
synagogue a more fitting house of worship, for the greater glory of
God.
In short, therefore, I do not think it is particularly wise or
accurate to compartmentalize the happiness one seeks into
happiness sought via religion versus happiness sought via the
corporation. I fully appreciate that some attempt to do this—to
divide the world into spiritual and secular, placing religion into one
category and the corporation into another. But this can also be
undone, and for many, these lines are quite blurred. Corporate law
ought not turn a blind eye to these possibilities. The reasons why
individuals do what they do can be both myriad and quite
complicated. Consequently, “[t]he discipline of corporate law
should acknowledge the richness and complexity of commercial
endeavor,”27 and eschew an approach that unrealistically
constricts our understanding of the corporation (and its various
actors).

25. See Joshua J. Mark, Religion in the Ancient World, ANCIENT HIST.
ENCYCLOPEDIA (Sept. 2, 2009), https://www.ancient.eu/religion/ (last visited May
2, 2017) (describing the history and role of religion in ancient cultures) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. Lyman Johnson, Michael Naughton & William Bojan, Rethinking How
Business Purpose Is Taught in Catholic Business Education, 32 J. CATH. HIGHER
ED. 59, 75 (2013 [hereinafter Johnson et al., Rethinking]
27. Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate
Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 936 (1990) [hereinafter Johnson,
Delaware Judiciary].
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III. The Historical Linkage of Faith and Work
As acknowledged, some individuals may choose to
compartmentalize their spiritual life and their secular life. Some
adhere to a separation of faith and work. I have not seen statistics
demonstrating whether this approach is shared by the greater or
lesser part of humankind today.28
Historically speaking, however, such a compartmentalization,
or separation, would have been quite anomalous.29 Throughout
most of humanity’s existence, practically every decision of import
was viewed as having moral repercussions and a religious
dimension.30 Decisions about money, from how to earn it to how to
spend it, were no exception.31 Indeed, it is no mere coincidence that
economics, as a discipline, was originally a “branch of morality
philosophy.”32 Important economic decisions are ordinarily
understood as important moral decisions as well.33 And important
moral decisions are, for every religion that I am aware of, typically
important religious decisions too.
Recall the words of Christ, which, I believe, would resonate
with non-Christians as well: “For what shall it profit a man, if he
28. To the extent that most do subscribe to such separation, I would concur
with the following sentiments expressed by Professor Johnson: “Having
abandoned the quest for unity of aesthetic or philosophical vision, the postmodern
sensibility may regard this question as not only hopelessly opaque but pointless
even to ask. Such regard, however, says more about the emptiness of the
postmodern outlook than the enduring value of the question.” Id. at 866 n.3.
29. See Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 7
(2013) [hereinafter Colombo, The Naked Private Square] (“In other words, what
has brought about this separation of ‘church and business?’ As an initial matter,
the separation does not appear to be a particularly natural one, in the sense that
it fails to comport with the traditions of human society.”).
30. See id. at 11 (“It is not simply the case that work traditionally possessed
a religious dimension but rather that it was also traditionally understood that
‘every economic decision has a moral consequence.’” (quoting GEORGE P.
SCHWARTZ & WILLIAM J. KOSHELNYK, GOOD RETURNS: MAKING MONEY BY MORALLY
RESPONSIBLE INVESTING xvi (2010))).
31. And, in more modern times, we see these concerns affect decisions on
how to invest money as well, with the advent of socially-responsible and
religiously-directed mutual funds.
32. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, supra note 29, at 11–12 (2013).
33. See id. at 11 (“[I]t was . . . traditionally understood that ‘every economic
decision has a moral consequence.’” (quoting GEORGE P. SCHWARTZ & WILLIAM J.
KOSHELNYK, GOOD RETURNS: MAKING MONEY BY MORALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING
xvi (2010))).
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gain the whole world, and suffer the loss of his soul?”34 Would not
this apply to matters less weighty than the whole world? Would
not this apply to the gain of stock dividends or additional income
as well? Of course it would.35
St. Paul also addressed this same concept, but from a proactive
angle: “Whether you eat or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all
to the glory of God . . . All whatsoever you do in word or in work,
all things do ye in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ.”36
Nearly two-thousand years later, G.K. Chesterton essentially
summarized St. Paul in his own words when he wrote:
You say grace before meals. All right. But I say grace before the
concert and the opera, and grace before the play and
pantomime, and grace before I open a book, and grace before
sketching, painting, swimming, fencing, boxing, walking,
playing, dancing and grace before I dip the pen in the ink. 37

In short, there is a long and venerable tradition within which
practically everything we say, do, and encounter ought to be
treated as a matter of religious concern. The activity of the
corporation is not exempt from this. Indeed, corporate activity
frequently (if not virtually always) overlaps with matters upon
which religion has much to say. Consequently, the faithful
religious consumer, worker, officer, director, or shareholder should
be expected to take his or her religious principles and beliefs into
account when interacting with (or within) the business
corporation. As Professor Johnson observed: “Given the
interconnectedness of our work and personal lives, the
institutional answer [to the purpose of the corporation] inevitably
spills into and colors our sense of individual meaning as well.”38

34. Mark 8:36 (Douay-Rheims).
35. Cf. Johnson, Delaware Judiciary, supra note 27, at 877 (“Given the
interconnectedness of our work and personal lives, the institutional answer [to
the purpose of the corporation] inevitably spills into and colors our sense of
individual meaning as well.”).
36. 1 Corinthians 10:31; Colossians 3:17.
37. Gilbert K. Chesterton Quote, IZ QUOTES, http://izquotes.com/quote/295385
(last visited May 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
38. Johnson, Delaware Judiciary, supra note 27, at 877.
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IV. Corporations and Religion
The modern business corporation, and indeed corporate law
itself, overflows with interpersonal interactions, and continuously
implicates how we, as human beings, ought to treat one another.
Thus, our observations about the interconnectedness of faith and
work are particularly relevant to the corporation itself.
Indeed, just as economics was originally a branch of moral
philosophy (as mentioned above), “corporation law exists, not as an
isolated body of rules and principles, but rather in a historical
setting and as a part of a larger body of law premised upon shared
values.”39 The duty of care, for example, central to corporate law,
is rich with religious meaning, as Professor Johnson has pointed
out in his scholarship.40 “Fiduciary duties retain a moral and
spiritual quality even in the highly secularized discourse of
twenty-first century corporate law.”41 Thus, one need not strain to
see the overlapping territory of religious and corporate concern—
the confluence is, quite frequently, in plain sight.
And even putting aside the moral dimension of “purely”
economic and fiscal decisions, or fiduciary obligations, “[d]irectors
and managers, as representatives of shareholders, vicariously
confront moral choices all the time and they should address them
in just that way—as moral choices.”42
Nevertheless, just as many separate faith and work, still more
view the corporation as an inherently and thoroughly secular
institution.43 Narrower still, the corporation, and even corporate
39. Id. at 919 (1990) (quoting City Capital Assocs. Ltd. v. Interco, Inc., 551
A.2d 787, 800 (Del. Ch. 1988), appeal dismissed as moot, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del.
1988)).
40. See Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law,
28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 28, 43 (2003) [hereinafter Johnson, After Enron] (“Modern
corporate law has inherited, but risks squandering, a rich, moral
vocabulary . . . . Religious stories confirm the central place of care.”); see also
Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1, 28 (2006) [hereinafter Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness] (“Fiduciary duties
retain a moral and spiritual quality even in the highly secularized discourse of
twenty-first century corporate law.”).
41. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness, supra note 40, at 28.
42. Lyman Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of Corporate Responsibility, 70
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 957, 963 (2002) [hereinafter Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of
Corporate Responsibility].
43. See Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness, supra note 40, at 2 (“The
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law, is commonly analyzed only under economic lenses—to the
exclusion of several other fields of human knowledge.44 As such,
attempts to introduce religious concerns or insights into an
analysis of the corporation are quite alien to the field of corporate
law and typically jarring to the corporate lawyer.45
Religion itself appears to shoulder some of the blame for this.
Sustained attention upon the nature of the corporate form from
religious quarters has generally been lacking.46 Professor Johnson
commented upon this “failure of Christian thought to attend
specifically to the linking of faith and work,”47 adding that it “leads
managers . . . to live ‘a divided life.’”48
That said, there have been exceptions to this. In recent times,
Michael Novak stands out as someone who has seriously
undertaken the work of crafting a “theology of the corporation.”49
He has his predecessors, however. Pope Pius XI, for example,
sketched a tradition of corporate purpose quite different from the
common account put forth by Berle and Means.50 Under the
vocabulary of corporate law theory may be secular because that which is
observed—the corporation—is thought to be a wholly secular institution best
understood solely in secular terms, or because the overarching conceptual
framework of most scholars is itself exclusively secular, thereby overlooking the
corporation’s religious dimension.”).
44. See Lyman Johnson, New Approaches to Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1713, 1722 (1993) (“We need . . . to search for insights in the fields of
anthropology, sociology, political science, ethics and theology, psychology, and
industrial organization.”).
45. See Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness, supra note 40, at 17
The general lack of attention to the role of religious faith in corporate
law is surprising, given that corporate law, like other areas of law, has
been assessed from a host of other standpoints. Much of the ‘silence’ in
corporate scholarship may . . . simply stem from a lack of interest in
religion on the part of legal scholars or from a belief that religion is
irrelevant to modern corporate theory. It may also reflect adherence to
a ‘norm’ among legal academics generally to the effect that religion and
legal scholarship do not mix.
46. See id. (“[V]ery little corporate law scholarship examines the corporation
from a religious vantage point.”).
47. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, A Role for Law and Lawyers in Educating
(Christian) Business Managers About Corporate Purpose 31 (University of St.
Thomas School of Law, Working Paper No. 08–22, 2008) [hereinafter Johnson, A
Role for Law and Lawyers].
48. Id.
49. MICHAEL NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION 33 (1990).
50. See Johnson et al., Rethinking, supra note 26, at 67 (“[U]nlike Berle and
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Catholic Social Teaching tradition in which Pius XI wrote,
“business either moves on a trajectory that sees itself as an
‘association of individuals’ or as a ‘community of persons,’”51 the
former of which supports a more contractarian vision of the
corporation, the latter of which supports a more communitarian
view of the corporation (a point to which we shall return).
Pope John Paul II addressed the corporation, identifying the
organization as a “community of persons.”52 More recently, Pope
Benedict XVI stated that any conceptualization of the corporation
must be grounded upon “a comprehensive picture of man which
respects all the dimensions of his being and which subordinates his
material and instinctive dimensions to his interior and spiritual
ones.”53 In other words, “[w]hile it is true that human beings are
individuals who have self-interests and seek utility, they are not
only individuals but also persons with a spiritual and relational
dimension.”54 This remains true whether these persons are serving
as officers, directors, or shareholders of a corporation.
Admittedly, however, the voices above remain in the minority
when it comes to the common conceptualization of the corporation.
Instead, as alluded to earlier, economic analysis has largely
monopolized the field of corporate discourse.55 This monopolization
extends not only to scholarly commentary on corporate law and the
corporation itself, but also to the understanding that officers and
directors have regarding the proper fulfillment of their duties to
Means, he encouraged business leaders to move from understanding the firm as
only an investor-centered exchange of contracts and market incentives to one of
relationship or partnership between capital and labor that would be drawn from
the larger moral and religious culture.”).
51. Id. at 68.
52. See id. at 73 (“[A]lthough Pius XI began to develop a view of the
corporation as a partnership and community, it was not until 1991 that John Paul
II provided one of the most explicit definitions of the purpose of business within
Catholic social teachings by using the phrase ‘community of persons.’”).
53. Id. at 77 (quoting Benedict XVI, Caritas in veritate, 36).
54. Id. at 74.
55. See Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness, supra note 40, at 1–2
Discourse in corporate law theory is highly secular. This quality both
reflects, and shapes, the nature of discourse within corporations
themselves. Virtually nontheoretical until the mid-1970s, corporate
law scholarship has been deeply influenced in the last thirty years by
neoclassical economic analysis, and, more recently, it has been
enriched by a host of other perspectives.
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the corporation. This has led to a pernicious view of the corporate
boardroom as values-free zone focused solely on economic profit
and loss.
It has been said that the devil’s greatest accomplishment was
to convince the world that he doesn’t exist. Analogously, perhaps
it has been the greatest accomplishment of law-and-economics
scholars to convince the world that efficiency and economics are
value neutral.56 For it is exactly this perspective that has helped
further the notion that corporate officers and directors ought not
interject their values into corporate decision-making, but should,
rather, adhere to the purportedly value-neutral program of
maximizing profits for the benefit of the corporation’s
shareholders.57 This awful myth has had profoundly negative
consequences. For “[t]here is no moral free zone”58 as Professor
Johnson has pointed out. Prioritizing efficiency is as much of a
value judgment as any other. Similarly, operating a business to
maximize profits is a value judgment just as any other. Regardless
of whether a person agrees or disagrees with the propriety of
prioritizing efficiency and profit maximization, he or she ought to
acknowledge the fairly modest assertion that these positions
necessarily reflect certain value-choices. Indeed, these reflect
rather profound value-choices, and as such reinforce the point that
corporate conduct implicates the kinds of concerns over which
religion has traditionally (and continues to have) a great deal to
say. For contrary to the popular modern misconception, the vast
majority of religious teaching and exhortation is not about sex. It
is more typically about how one best fulfills his or her duties to
God. This, in turn, is ordinarily worked out via a person’s
treatment of and interactions with his fellow man (sexual ethics is
but one inevitable sub-set of this).
56. I don’t mean to compare those in the law-and-economics movement to the
devil.
57. See Johnson et al., Rethinking, supra note 26, at 70
In the shareholder-centric view, the corporation favors the shareholder
as the central claimant in the corporation. Those who manage
corporate assets are not thought to have the power to choose among
values. Instead, within this “association of shares,” the firm serves
largely as a locus for exchanging outputs and inputs, where managers
seek to maximize re-turns for shareholders.
58. Id. at 68.
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V. The Necessarily Religious Understanding of Corporate Purpose
Let us now return to the three possible options that are
presented to us with regard to religious conceptualizations of
corporate purpose, as highlighted at the outset of this Essay. For
easier analysis, I have reframed and reordered them here:
 Option 1: By virtue of its nature, the corporation
cannot have a religious purpose
 Option 2: By virtue of its nature, the corporation
may or may not, within its own discretion, have a
religious purpose
 Option 3: By virtue of its nature, the corporation
must have a religious purpose
Although I have already announced my preference for Option
3, here I will nevertheless march through all three options
methodically, elaborating upon the deficiencies afflicting Options
1 and 2.
In a number of states, including New York59 and New Jersey,60
state corporate law explicitly addresses, in great detail, “religious
corporations.” By “religious corporations,” the statutes do not
mean entities such as Hobby Lobby or Chick-fil-A, but rather
parishes, congregations, dioceses, and the like.61 In these states,
religious entities are organized explicitly as corporations.62 As
would be expected, their purposes are inherently religious in
nature.
Some may balk, however, and assert that the observation set
forth above is irrelevant. They would point out that “business
corporations,” are the focus here, and not non-profit “religious
corporations.” They would want to reformulate Option 1 as: “By
virtue of its nature, the business corporation cannot have a
religious purpose.” I will allow that reformulation for argument’s
sake, but before doing so I would like to point out the weakness of
the distinction between a “for-profit” corporation and a “non-profit”
corporation.
59. N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW (McKinney 2016).
60. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16 (West 2016).
61. See generally N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW § 2 (McKinney 2016); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 16:1–1 (West 2016).
62. See generally N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW § 2; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:1–1.
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The naysayers essentially claim “for-profit corporations
cannot have a religious purpose.” They are willing to concede, as
they absolutely must, that the universe of organizations that take
on the corporate form includes some that are explicitly religious.63
Such religious corporations must be, they argue, invariably
nonprofit in form. And the line between for-profit and nonprofit
corporations is a thick one and shall not be crossed.
But is it not crossed quite frequently? As has Professor
Johnson, I have previously questioned the for-profit and non-profit
distinction.64 Both such entities, regardless of their categorization,
typically work very hard to increase revenues and reduce costs.65
Indeed, the day-to-day operations of both for-profit and nonprofit
corporations can closely resemble one another.
Nevertheless, the significant difference between the two (as
the argument goes) is that for-profit corporations are viewed as
entirely profit-driven, whereas non-profit corporations are viewed
as “mission” driven.66 “Mission” driven is understood as some
philanthropic or charitable cause—not strictly a focus on the
organization’s bottom line.67 This is, however, repeatedly belied in
practice. The NCAA, for example, is an $11 billion “non-profit”
corporation.68 A large number of “for-profit” business corporations
not only enjoy far less income, but, moreover, are demonstrably
more dedicated to philanthropic causes and concerns.69 Put
63. Supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
64. See Johnson, A Role for Law and Lawyers, supra note 47, at 17 (“Perhaps
the current typology of ‘for profit’ and ‘not for profit’ organizations is too
dichotomous if the former means only a focus on maximizing returns to capital.”).
65. See id. (“To be sure, business corporations will and must make
profits . . . .”).
66. See RONALD J. COLOMBO, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION 71–74 (2015) (discussing the alleged distinction between for-profit
and nonprofit corporations).
67. See generally What is a Mission-Driven Business?, TERRAPASS: THE
FOOTPRINT BLOG, https://www.terrapass.com/what-is-a-missi (last visited Mar.
28, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
68. Andrew Syrios, The NCAA Racket: $10 Billion ‘Non-Profit’ Organization,
VALUE WALK (Sept. 16, 2014, 7:38 PM), http://www.valuewalk.com/2014/09/ncaabusiness/ (last visited May 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
69. See Evangeline Gomez, The Rise of the Charitable For-Profit Entity,
FORBES (Jan. 13, 2012, 6:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/evangelinegomez/
2012/01/13/the-rise-of-the-charitable-for-profit-entity/#fbff0be291cc (last visited
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differently, it is mistaken to suggest that nonprofits are invariably
more “mission-oriented” and that “for-profits” are invariable more
“revenue-oriented.” Quite frequently, these characteristics are
reversed.
Critically, as Professors Johnson and Millon have pointed out
time and again, there is nothing in corporate law that precludes a
for-profit business corporation from being mission-oriented, even
at the sacrifice of some degree of profitability.70 “Perhaps the
current typology of ‘for-profit’ and ‘not-for-profit’ organizations is
too dichotomous if the former means only a focus on maximizing
returns to capital.”71
But, even if we acknowledge the possibility, or recognize the
reality, of mission-driven, for-profit corporations, does it follow
that a corporation can be religious in nature as well? Might a
for-profit business corporation with a religious purpose be simply
a bridge too far? I find myself again in agreement with Professor
Johnson who wrote, in 2006, that “[a] business corporation . . . is
not, and need not be, inherently secular in nature.”72 There exist
several companies whose “founders and leaders . . . were culturally
embedded in a faith tradition that influenced how they and their
families understood business.”73 Many go a step further and
embrace a fundamentally religious purpose. Hobby Lobby and
Chick-fil-A come to mind.
May 2, 2017) (describing “two new types of corporations have been created to
address the goals of making money, attracting private investors and addressing
societal concerns”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
70. See Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness, supra note 40, at 19 (“[I]t is not
law—where managerial discretion is broad, though still constrained by fiduciary
duties—that silences the religious voice within corporations.”). I personally
quibble with Professors Johnson and Millon over the legal force of the
shareholder-wealth-maximization norm. Whereas they read Dodge v. Ford as
nonbinding, I generally believe that it does accurately describe the duties of a
corporation’s directors. That said, I readily concede that, practically speaking,
due to the business judgment rule, a corporation’s officers and directors would
ordinarily have wide latitude in pursuing objectives aside from the maximization
of corporate profits.
71. Johnson, A Role for Law and Lawyers, supra note 47, at 17.
72. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness, supra note 40, at 3; see also Johnson et
al., Rethinking, supra note 26, at 68 (“Berle and Means and Pius XI reflect two
different models, and two different traditions, of the corporation’s purpose which
have developed over the last eighty years.”).
73. Johnson et al., Rethinking, supra note 26, at 74–75 (2013).

828

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 813 (2017)

According to Hobby Lobby: “We are committed to: (1) Honoring
the Lord in all we do by operating the company in a manner
consistent with Biblical principles . . . .”74 That is a religious
purpose. So, unless one is willing to assert that Hobby Lobby is
lying to itself and the public (an assertion that was not raised in
federal litigation when there was ample opportunity and incentive
to do so),75 then it is simply undeniable that this particular
corporation does, in fact, have a religious purpose.
Indeed, the law itself in many states has come to recognize
that corporations need not exist for solely the purpose of
maximizing profits.76 Via the promulgation of “Benefit
Corporation” statutes, business organizations in a growing
number of states are explicitly authorized to take into account
concerns of social interest—concerns that go beyond simply those
of profit maximization.77 “Benefit Corp. statutes illuminate the
unresolved muddle in corporate law doctrine and theory
concerning the inter-relationship among corporate purpose, a
corporation’s best interests, and fiduciary duties.”78
In light of the overwhelming evidence that religiously inspired
business corporations do exist,79 and in light of changes in
corporate law authorizing such corporations to exist,80 why would
anyone continue to contest this fact? I would posit it is because
74. Our Story, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/about-us/our-story
(last visited May 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
75. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
76. See Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and
Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 270 (2013) [hereinafter Johnson,
Pluralism in Corporate Form] (“Pioneered by Maryland in 2010, Benefit Corp.
statutes subsequently sailed through the New York and New Jersey legislatures
without a single dissenting vote.”).
77. See RONALD J. COLOMBO, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION 62–63 (2015) (“The New York benefit corporation statute (which is
typical), proclaims that the corporation’s directors and officers ‘shall not be
required to give priority to the interests of any particular person or group . . . over
the interests of any other person or group.’”).
78. Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form, supra note 76, at 298.
79. See Colombo, The Naked Private Square, supra note 29, at 21 (suggesting
that a newly formed company is likely created by an individual influenced by
religion given that fifty-five percent of Americans generally prioritize religion in
life).
80. See id. at 50–51 (explaining that states were beginning to allow
businesses to incorporate for any purpose even absent public-oriented objectives).
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they are not happy with what they see as the repercussions of
acknowledging it. It is akin to Joan Osborne’s 1995 song “One of
Us.” That’s the song that kept plaintively asking “what if God was
one of us?”81 In one of her verses, Osborne sings the following:
If God had a face, what would it look like?
And would you want to see
If seeing meant that you would have to believe
In things like Heaven and in Jesus and the saints
And all the prophets?82

In short, commentators fear that by acknowledging that
corporations could have a religious purpose, they would be buying
into a parade of horribles.83 This would include, but not be limited
to religious exemptions against contraceptive coverage, a right to
discrimination (especially against sexual minorities), and the
unwelcome proselytizing of employees and customers.84 I think it
is pretty unmistakable that this is what drives a large part of the
opposition against recognizing the possibility that business
corporations can be legitimately religious.
Frankly, this opposition is understandable, as these issues
touch upon some deep cultural, ideological, and philosophical
concerns that divide our nation. But scholars and all informed
individuals of good faith ought to defuse the situation by noting
that one acknowledgment does not entail the other. That is, as a
matter of law, under both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, simply adhering to a set of
religious beliefs does not automatically afford one the right to a
religious exemption.85 Indeed, in the vast majority of situations,
individuals and religious institutions (even unquestionably
religious institutions) are afforded no relief whatsoever from laws
81. JOAN OSBORNE, One of Us, on RELISH (Blue Gorilla Records 1995).
82. Id.
83. See Colombo, The Naked Private Square, supra note 29, at 12–13 (“It was
simply seen as unwise to introduce a subject as ‘divisive’ as religion into the
business setting, which thrives on unity, stability, and peace.”).
84. See id. at 81 (“The primary objection that can be anticipated is the fear
of rampant discrimination in hiring, accommodation, and other areas in the wake
of corporate Free Exercise rights.”).
85. See id. (“Consequently, recognition of corporate Free Exercise rights does
not mean that corporations will be necessarily absolved of compliance with
laws . . . even if they happen to be fervently religious in character.”).
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that violate the dictates of their religiously informed consciences
and principles.86
That said, it would be disingenuous not to acknowledge that
recognition of a corporation’s religious purpose certainly opens the
door to such developments, whereas avoiding recognition of a
corporation’s religious purpose would seem to keep the door tightly
shut. However, it is, in my opinion, one of the worst tendencies of
advocates, and one that oftentimes borders on intellectual
dishonesty, to unreasonably insist on yielding no ground
whatsoever on a given point out of fear of what might eventually
follow therefrom. I suggest that if a given situation or context most
reasonably suggests a particular characterization or result, that
characterization or result ought to follow on the strength of its own
merits; it ought not be held back or denied out of fear of some other,
hypothetical situation or context that might thereafter arise.
But to assuage such understandable fears, it should be
recognized that courts and administrative agencies may very well
settle upon different standards with regard to religious
exemptions—one for individuals, one for churches, and one for
religiously motivated business corporations. In other words, the
complicated and controversial field of religious exemptions and
accommodations is an issue separate and apart from the question
of whether or not a business corporation can be deemed to be
religious.
Thus, in the face of evidence that some for-profit business
corporations are, in fact, formed and operated pursuant to an
explicit religious purpose,87 it seems foolish to argue that this is
inconceivable. To do so (and if you will forgive another pop culture
reference) reminds me of the film A Princess Bride,88 in which the
character, Vizzini, frequently proclaims something that has just
happened to be “inconceivable.” In reply another character, Inigo

86. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (“Not all burdens
on religion are unconstitutional. The state may justify a limitation on religious
liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental
interest.”) (internal citations omitted).
87. See Colombo, The Naked Private Square, supra note 29, at 20
(illustrating how biblical principles directed the business approach of
Chick-Fil-A’s founder).
88. THE PRINCESS BRIDE (20th Century Fox 1987).
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Montoya, responds, “[y]ou keep using that word. I do not think it
means what you think it means.”89
Option 2 would, therefore, seem to represent much firmer
ground. This is the perspective that a corporation may or may not
have a religious purpose depending on its own wishes. For every
corporation that has selected an identifiable religious purpose
(such as Hobby Lobby), there are dozens that have not.90 Thus,
Option 2 seems unassailable.
And if Option 2 is unassailable, logic would dictate that Option
3 must be rejected. For Option 3 posited that “by virtue of its
nature, the corporation must have a religious purpose.” Just as the
existence of corporations with a religious purpose defeated Option
1, the existence of corporations lacking a religious purpose defeats
Option 3. Case closed.
Or is it? Is there really such a thing as a corporation lacking a
religious purpose? If I am correct in stating, as I did earlier, that
both religion and corporations share a common fundamental
purpose (to attain human happiness), would it not follow that all
corporations, by definition, possess a religious purpose regardless
of their declared objectives? I suggest that this may be so. In other
words, if the pursuit of happiness (along with the means by which
this pursuit is conducted) is an inextricably religious undertaking,
and if the profit-maximizing objective of the paradigmatic business
corporation is simply one instantiation of that basic human
longing, then it would seem to follow that the purpose of the
business corporation, any business corporation, is necessarily and
inescapably religious by its very nature. This is regardless of the
intentions of the corporation’s founders, owners, employees, and
customers (although, in fairness, sometimes explicitly pursuant to
them).

89. The Princess Bride Quotes, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt
0093779/quotes (last visited Mar. 28, 2017) (providing specific character quotes
from the film) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
90. See Colombo, The Naked Private Square, supra note 29, at 6 (“The
modern business corporation is commonly portrayed as a thoroughly secular
institution in which religion plays no role and has no place.”).
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VI. Repercussions

The conclusion that the business corporation is, by its nature,
necessarily an institution with a religious purpose gives rise to a
number of consequences and repercussions. Some of these have
been touched upon previously.91
Primary among these might be the contribution that a
religious understanding of corporate purpose can have to the
ongoing debate between contractarians on the one hand and
communitarians on the other.92 This debate is focused largely on
the shareholder primacy norm—whether it ought to persist and, if
so, how it ought to be understood.93
What is at stake [in this debate] is a profound difference in
normative world view. This ideological difference defines the
basic divide between communitarians and contractarians . . . .
Contractarians start from the presumption that people ought to
be free to make their own choices about how to live their
lives . . .
Communitarians [believe] . . . individuals owe obligations to
each other that exist independently of contract . . . . The state
acts appropriately when it enforces such duties. 94

To most contractarians, the corporation is “merely an
intersection of atomistic contracting individuals.”95 From this it
ordinarily follows that the corporation exists to serve, primarily,
the interests of the shareholders.96 These interests, in turn, are
91. See supra Part V (discussing commentators’ fears over contraception
coverage, employer discrimination, and proselytization).
92. See David Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians,
Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373,
1375–76 (1993) [hereinafter Millon, Crisis in Corporate Law] (“[T]hirty states
have passed statutes that allow management to consider enumerated
nonshareholder interests (in addition to those of shareholders) in corporate
decisionmaking.”).
93. See id. at 1377 (“The possibility of effective shareholder control seems to
promise a revolution in corporate governance no less startling than the emergence
into plain view of nonshareholder considerations.”).
94. Id. at 1382–83.
95. Lyman Johnson, Making (Corporate) Law in a Skeptical World, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 161, 177 (1992).
96. See id. at 178 (“Corporate activity surely shapes individual preferences
and behavior as well as being shaped by them.”) (emphasis added).
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typically reduced to that of maximizing economic returns.97 This is
currently the prevalent understanding of the corporation: that “the
business firm—in its typical form, the corporation—is managed, or
at least should be managed, in the sole interest of the body of
shareholders . . . .”98
If a detour may be permitted, I have long questioned the
appropriateness of equating shareholder primacy with shareholder
wealth maximization.99 So too has Professor Johnson, who queried,
“whether shareholders themselves really reject calls for more
socially responsible conduct. Do we wrongly caricature them in
portraying them as intolerant of socially/morally responsible
conduct?”100 This digression introduces the possibility of
recognizing a more socially responsible conceptualization of
officers’ and directors’ fiduciary duties within the existing
framework of the shareholder primacy norm.101 Unfortunately, few
others have shown an appetite for reformulating shareholder
primacy along these lines.102 As such, the contractarians and
communitarians somewhat resemble the entrenched Entente and
Central armies of World War I along the Western Front.
According to the communitarians (a term I am using to
broadly cover the advocates of “progressive corporate law” and
stakeholder theorists), the corporation ought not be beholden to
97. See Ronald J. Colombo, Ownership, Limited: Reconciling Traditional and
Progressive Corporate Law via an Aristotelian Understanding of Ownership, 34 J.
CORP. L. 247, 258–59 (2008) [hereinafter Colombo, Ownership, Limited]
(discussing how shareholders provide equity investment in exchange for the
expectation of officers’ and directors’ fiduciary duties).
98. Lyman Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between Judicial and Legislative
Notions of Target Management Conduct, 14 J. CORP. LAW 35, 40 (1988) (quoting
M. AOKI, THE CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM 3 (1984)).
99. See Colombo, Ownership, Limited, supra note at 97, 268–69 (discussing
the main objective for the board of directors is to maximize shareholder wealth).
100. Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of Corporate Responsibility, supra note 42,
at 965.
101. See Colombo, Ownership, Limited, supra note at 97, 268–69 (“Many (if
not most) individuals subscribe to values and principles that surpass material
wealth in order of importance, and routinely factor moral and ethical concerns
into their decision-making.”).
102. See id. at 267 (“[T]he predominant modern view of property ownership
largely disclaims moral obligations . . . . shareholders . . . are usually viewed as
mere investors, detached from any personal moral obligations derived from their
status as owners of a corporation.”).
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shareholders alone—or perhaps even to the shareholders
primarily.103 Rather, the corporation’s officers and directors are
compelled to take into account the interests of various corporate
constituencies, including, for example, employees and
consumers.104 Naturally, “[c]ommunitarians also differ from
contractarians in emphasizing the broad social effects of corporate
activity,”105 and as such the corporate social responsibility
movement is largely fueled by communitarian perspectives of
corporate law.106
Professors Johnson and Millon have long asserted that “[t]he
idea of shareholder primacy . . . no longer commands general
respect.”107 At the same time, however, they have been forced to
recognize that “[i]f corporate law is to move beyond exclusive
concern for shareholders, some will seek to develop a new
theoretical foundation upon which a new body of doctrine can be
erected . . . . Those who say that communitarians have not yet
articulated a fully developed alternative agenda are correct.”108 I
suggest that by conceptualizing the purpose of the corporation as
inherently (or unavoidably) religious, we travel further down the
road toward such a new theoretical foundation. We do so by
infusing our understanding of the corporation with
“other-regarding, caring impulse[s] and some subduing of the
egoistic, self-serving impulse. We need this both in our personal
lives and in our institutional lives, of which the business
corporation is just one instance.”109 Indeed, it may even help
legitimize the corporation, for our current decision to “rest the
corporation’s legitimacy on faithful allegiance to capital is to
103. See id. at 255–58 (examining the inevitable reduction of employees and
increased layoffs following a corporate takeover).
104. See id. (“[S]tate legislatures across the United States passed
“constituency” statutes that enable . . . boards to take into account the interests
of nonshareholder stakeholders in corporate decision-making.”).
105. See Millon, Crisis in Corporate Law, supra note 92, at 1379.
106. See id. (“Communitarians see corporations as more than just
agglomerations of private contracts; they’re powerful institutions whose conduct
has substantial public implications.”).
107. Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Takeovers and Corporate
Law: Who’s in Control?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1177, 1210 (1993).
108. Millon, Crisis in Corporate Law, supra note 92, at 1387.
109. Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of Corporate Responsibility, supra note 42,
at 967.
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demean the contributions of others and, in the end, to expect very
little of the institution.”110
How would a religious understanding of corporate purpose
help accomplish this and further a more communitarian vision of
corporate law? This is possible in a number of ways.
For starters, it would reinvigorate a more balanced
understanding of the duties of officers and directors.111 “As we
currently stand in the midst of a seemingly strict shareholder
primacy theoretical era, it should be recalled that normative
positions on corporate purpose have dramatically changed,
historically.”112 Similarly, “[i]deas about what corporations are,
and the normative implications that follow from those ideas, have
changed radically over time.”113
A religious understanding of corporate purpose would harken
us back to yesteryear—to a time when the shareholder primacy
norm was not ensconced in corporate law to the same degree as it
is today. As Professor Millon has explained:
Radical shareholder primacy’s conception of corporate
governance contrasts with an older, long-established model that
I term traditional shareholder primacy . . . . Once it is
understood that the [radical] agency model is aspirational
rather than grounded in corporate law, a more serious
conversation about corporate purpose and the desirable balance
of power between management and shareholders can occur. 114

This would, in turn, help justify an approach to corporate law
that is far more accommodating to the interests of non-shareholder
constituencies than the prevailing approach. In place of the
current “fragmented and cramped conception of corporate purpose”
110. Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are They For?,
supra note 1, at 822.
111. See Colombo, The Naked Private Square, supra note 29, at 87–88
(“[F]ailure to recognize the religious liberty rights of the business
corporation . . . undermine[s] both the spirit and the efficacy of the First
Amendment and call[s] into question our nation’s alleged commitment to
pluralism, diversity, and tolerance.”).
112. Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business
Judgement Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. 405, 438 (2013).
113. David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 262
(1990).
114. David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013,
1043–44 (2013).
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a religious understanding of corporate purpose would invite a more
serious discussion about how the corporation “can both be better
governed and contribute more positively to society.”115
A religious understanding of corporate purpose would also
reinvigorate our approach to fiduciary duties, as alluded to
previously.116 For “[m]odern corporate law has inherited . . . a rich,
moral vocabulary[]”117 that has largely been squandered by the
“quest to bottom law on economic efficiency . . . .”118 “The historic
decision within corporate law initially to deploy a moral vocabulary
suggests a view that a moral subject matter was under
consideration.”119
Since “[r]eligious stories confirm the central place of care[,]”120
religion can serve a useful role in fleshing out the full depths of
corporate fiduciary duties. A religious reading of fiduciary duties
could, for example, help justify “a ‘covenantal interpretation’ of the
corporation.”121
Some might protest that, regardless of its desirability, any
effort to veer from the shareholder wealth maximization runs afoul
established corporate law.122 Professor Johnson has repeatedly
attacked this notion, arguing “not a single corporate statute
explicitly addresses the purpose of corporate activity.”123 He has
added “no U.S. law requires a business corporation to maximize
shareholder wealth except in one unusual setting. Instead, the law
is ambivalent as to, and therefore remarkable permissive on, the
question of corporate purpose, according senior managers
significant discretion on a matter of signal importance.”124 Put
115. Johnson et al., Rethinking, supra note 26, at 60.
116. See supra Part VI (comparing shareholder primacy with shareholder
wealth maximization).
117. Johnson, After Enron, supra note 40, at 28.
118. Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty, supra note 3, at 2236.
119. Johnson, After Enron, supra note 40, at 53–54.
120. Id. at 43.
121. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness, supra note 40, at 16.
122. See Colombo, The Naked Private Square, supra note supra note 29, at 6–
7 (“[M]any balk at the notion that a business corporation should be afforded any
First Amendment rights . . . . The corporation is truly ‘monomaniac[al]’ and
‘soulless,’ existing for the singular purpose of profit-maximization . . . .”).
123. Johnson, Delaware Judiciary, supra note 27, at 874.
124. Johnson, A Role for Law and Lawyers, supra note 47, at 4.
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quite simply, “managers possess sufficient discretion to make
moral choices[,]” 125 even religiously based moral choices.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in the Hobby
Lobby126 case, concerning the “contraceptive mandate”
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services in
the wake of the Affordable Care Act, drives this point home quite
forcefully.127 For in that case, “the United States Supreme Court
speaks clearly to the fundamental issue of corporate purpose and
states correctly that corporate law authorizes non-profitmaximizing behavior.”128
However, merely recognizing that the constraints of the
shareholder wealth maximization norm on managerial discretion
are largely illusory is not enough. As Professor Johnson wrote: “the
necessary pre-condition—freedom—is not a sufficient condition for
successful reform. Also essential is a willingness to act and the
knowledge of how to act.”129 He continued:
Appreciating the scope of managerial freedom to act is thus the
necessary first step, but by itself not a sufficient step, for
attaining managerial conduct congruent with religious tenets.
To be given proper expression in the business-legal world,
religious convictions require a vocabulary that can mediate the
discourse of spiritual-religious insight, on the one hand, and
compliance with business and legal duties in the secular world,
on the other hand.130

Thus, although “no changes in positive law are needed to
introduce religious perspectives into corporate law,”131 normative
and cultural changes are probably necessary:
[I]t is not law—where managerial discretion is broad, though
still constrained by fiduciary duties—that silences the religious
125. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness, supra note 40, at 17.
126. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
127. See Lyman Johnson, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1,
30 (2015) (“Hobby Lobby illustrates that the business corporation is a legal
person . . . that . . . can have an institutional purpose distinct from that of its
shareholders.”).
128. Id. at 31.
129. Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of Corporate Responsibility, supra note 42,
at 963–64.
130. Johnson, A Role for Law and Lawyers, supra note 47, at 4.
131. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness, supra note 40, at 19.
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voice within corporations. Rather, it is the secularization of
corporate law discourse itself, along with social norms and
linguistic practices within corporations themselves, that hinder
free expression and therefore need reforming.132

This would take quite a bit of work, especially after decades of
fixation on wealth maximization. It would not be an
understatement to declare that, within the context of the
corporation, “moral discourse must be rejuvenated . . . .”133 This
would require “a willingness to engage in moral dialogue and
moral encounter”134 on the part of officers and directors—a far cry
from the current practice in which “directors enter the boardroom,
and abandon their pre-existing moral vision . . . .”135
Perhaps, however, the difficulty here is being overstated. For
if given the choice, “[i]t would be odd if business managers
themselves . . . did not draw on their deepest, most cherished
convictions in ascertaining how to think and act in the business
sphere.”136
Were such a normative transformation to be unleashed, the
effects upon corporate social responsible would be profound. For as
things currently stand, “[m]any citizens and business actors
continue to believe . . . that if one is obeying the law, then one is
also necessarily behaving in a morally responsible manner.”137
This is damning, as pursuant to this approach all law becomes a
de minimis form of morality that the vast majority of people would
most likely reject if they thoughtfully considered it. Yet,
nevertheless, officers and directors find themselves constrained to
the law itself, hesitant to venture much beyond its requirements.138
Liberating corporate officers and directors from this worldview
132. Id.
133. Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of Corporate Responsibility, supra note 42,
at 965.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 965–66.
136. Johnson, A Role for Law and Lawyers, supra note 47, at 29.
137. Lyman Johnson, Beyond the Inevitable and Inadequate Regulation of
Bankers: A Comment on Painter, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 29, 31 (2010).
138. See Johnson, A Role for Law and Lawyers, supra note 47, at 12 (“A recent
analysis of 167 studies conducted over thirty-five years on the linkage between
corporate social responsibility and corporate financial performance found no
correlation between ‘doing well’ and ‘doing good.’ In other words, deliberately
seeking to be socially responsible did not enhance profitability.”).
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would empower them to embrace a more fully human morality: one
that comports with their own intuitions and values, and not one
watered-down by the compromise and pragmatism of the
legislative process. This would also invite those officers and
directors who were not particularly religious to more comfortably
assert their deeply held moral beliefs as well—an additional,
collateral benefit to introducing religious perspectives into
corporate decision making.
Thus far, we have considered the societal consequences of a
religious conception of corporate purpose, especially with regard to
the phenomenon of corporate social responsibility. We should not
overlook, however, the consequences of such an understanding
upon those individuals who are themselves religious (a number
which is not insignificant).
Directors and senior officers will be freed from the psychological
and spiritual burden of keeping two distinct moral frames of
reference, one for work and the other for the rest of life. Instead,
they will face the formidable challenge of determining how to
advance the common corporate good by drawing on
understandings of faithfulness derived from deeper sources of
authority, including religious conviction.139

Not surprisingly, it has been found that the “effort to blend faith
and work led to more meaningful work experiences for the
individuals themselves, higher ethical standards, and more human
employee practices at the company level.”140 In other words, this
development would permit corporate officers and directors (in
addition to, perhaps, employees and shareholders) to live more
integrated lives, in which their professional responsibilities more
closely aligned with their deepest values and beliefs.141
Finally, and related to each of the preceding consequences,
recognition of the undeniably religious purposes of the corporation
would provide a firmer footing for the Supreme Court’s decision in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.142 As referenced previously, many
139. Id. at 32.
140. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness, supra note 40, at 16.
141. See id. (“[A] covenantal model both better situates the corporation in a
wider social context . . . link[ing] corporate endeavor to . . . social purpose, moral
values, and religious belief.”).
142. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014)
(“Congress did not discriminate in this way against men and women who wish to
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commentators continue to challenge the concept of corporate
religious liberty.143 Although the precise contours and form of this
liberty is a matter that merits serious thought and reflection, its
very possibility ought no longer be denied. Recognizing the
purposes of corporate activity as inherently religious in nature
helps promote this important debate by setting aside the
conversation-stopper that any religious understanding of the
corporation is simply inconceivable.
Elsewhere, I have studied the question of corporate religious
liberty.144 As I have argued, corporate religious liberty fosters a
more robust approach to corporate social responsibility and
contributes to the possibility of more authentically religious
corporate environments.145 This is because corporate religious
liberty enables a business corporation to embrace more fully a
religious identity, should it wish to do so, or to respond to religious
influences and impulses even if it forgoes an explicit religious
identity.146 It is difficult to embrace such identities, many of which
are counter-cultural, in the face of laws and regulations that serve
to undermine them.147 To provide just one example, it is difficult to
see how an authentically Catholic pharmacy could maintain its
identity as such if forced by law to sell contraceptives and
abortifacients, given the Catholic Church’s clear and consistent
teaching against such things.148 Thus, recognition of corporate
run their businesses as for-profit corporations in the manner required by their
religious beliefs.”).
143. See supra Part V (examining the low probability that a corporation may
take advantage of religious exemptions to the detriment of non-religiously
affiliated employees).
144. See Colombo, The Naked Private Square, supra note 29, at 3 (“a for-profit
corporation’s right to the free exercise of religion . . . cannot be fully realized if
relegated to the privacy of one’s home and temple.”).
145. Id. at 87–88 (“[F]ailure to recognize the religious liberty rights of the
business corporation means failure to recognize fully the religious liberty rights
of flesh-and-blood human beings.”).
146. Id. at 24 (suggesting that a company founded by an individual of strong
religious convictions, of which is implicated by the company’s policies and
practices, may attract investors, officers, and employees who share those same
convictions).
147. Id. at 6 (“American employment law has been interpreted to require a
religiously neutral workplace . . . business executives check their morals at the
door . . . .”).
148. See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 547–49, 570 (2d ed. 2016)
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religious liberty allows corporations to take religion seriously.149
And a seriously religious corporation will not view itself as merely
empowered to embrace the obligations posed by a robust
understanding of corporate social responsibility, but may very well
find itself compelled to embrace such responsibilities, derived from
the religious beliefs and convictions upon which it is grounded.150
Such recognition may also cause the corporation to adopt a
corporate culture and foster a workplace environment much more
in keeping with certain religious sensibilities.151
As referenced previously, a religious understanding of
corporate purpose certainly stokes the fears of some.152 Two rise to
the top of this list and merit our attention here.
The first is that a religious understanding of corporate
purpose would lead to the existence of more explicitly religious
business corporations, as described immediately above. Although
there were times when such a turn of events would have been
broadly welcome, this is not such a time. To many individuals
today, “religious” is viewed as equivalent to the sin of all sins:
intolerance.153 Although this is a characterization that I would
dispute vehemently and on a number of levels, this article is not a
piece on religious apologetics, and as such, I shall prescind from
doing so. I will, however, advert again to the wisdom of Professor
Johnson, who once wrote: “[I]n a market-oriented, democratic
society, there is no reason why business corporations do not exhibit
more institutional pluralism in both ends and approaches to
(“Human life must be respected and protected absolutely from the moment of
conception . . . . Formal cooperation in an abortion constitutes a grave offense.”).
149. Id. at 22 (“The values embraced by a corporation, religious or otherwise,
are of increasing concern to investors as well, and this, too, contributes to the rise
of the religiously expressive association.”).
150. Id. at 20 (“An individual’s development as a human being, on a variety
of levels, can very well occur largely within the context of their employment and
careers.”).
151. Id. (“[E]mployees are increasingly seeking out workplaces congruent
with their values—including their religious values.”).
152. See supra Part V (discussing individuals who refuse to recognize a
corporation’s religious character because of concerns that it would lead to the
development of hypothetical, future fears).
153. See Colombo, The Naked Private Square, supra note 29, at 10 (“[T]he
Protestant
Reformation,
which
tore
asunder
the
uniformity
of
religious belief . . . began the process of religious individualism, and with it the
inability to reach consensus on questions of faith.”).
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business.”154 In short, I am comfortable with a society in which
some of us are made uncomfortable by the religiosity of others.
Given the existing legal parameters in place, I trust that such
religiosity, just as any other deeply held set of beliefs, will not
frequently cross society’s lines of impropriety, and as such not give
rise to unjust discrimination or the like. This takes into account
the possibility of religious exemptions to such laws—exemptions
that the courts would be entrusted with policing.
From a corporate law perspective, some fear that by
untethering management from a strict duty of shareholder profit
maximization, we risk unleashing untold abuses upon corporate
shareholders.155 In other words, corporate fiduciaries cannot be
trusted to properly exercise such discretion: they will inevitably
take advantage of the opportunity to shirk their duties or, worse
still, put shareholders’ interests second to those of their personal
own.156 Power corrupts, and the danger with corporate mission
creep is the potential it has for entrusting corporate boards with
“uncontrollable power.”157
Here too Professor Johnson has provided us with some
insightful thoughts to consider:
Ensuring that managers do not wrongly advance their own
interests over shareholder welfare is one thing. It is another
thing, however, to focus so single-mindedly on the second-level,
‘agency’ problem that the deeper institutional dilemma of
harmonizing the interests of numerous physically absent
shareholders with the interests of a host of other corporate
participants is ignored. Viewed this way, as a subset of the
universal and longstanding individual/group dilemma, the real
challenge for corporate directors—and corporate governance—
should have been cast from the outset as the task of figuring out
how to constrain or induce directors to act in a way that

154. Johnson, A Role for Law and Lawyers, supra note 47, at 30.
155. See Millon, Crisis in Corporate Law, supra note 92, at 1384 (“[U]nder the
current corporate law, shareholders are for the most part entitled to pursue their
own financial advantages without regard for possible harms to
nonshareholders . . . .”).
156. See id. at 1374 (“[T]he ongoing theme in corporate law discourse has been
the need to increase the accountability of management to the corporation’s
shareholders.”).
157. Johnson, A Role for Law and Lawyers, supra note 47, at 793 (quoting 3
F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 82 (1982)).
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advances the interests of shareholders consistent with fulfilling
the overarching interests/purposes of the corporate group.158

In short, there ought to be a better way of constraining or
policing the conduct of officers and directors. We ought to reject a
solution that comes with so high a cost as that exacted by the
wealth maximization norm. As Professor Johnson has explained,
this current approach may have the tail wagging the dog:
[B]y stubbornly insisting that management focus exclusively on
shareholder welfare, corporate law’s dogma may well succeed in
checking management’s broad discretion. That success,
however, may come at the expense of preordaining the answer
to the more fundamental question of whether the single-minded
apotheosis of capital providers is in fact the proper aim of
corporate endeavor.159

Thus, “the belief that corporate managers should be held
accountable does not logically lead to the conclusion that
maximizing shareholder wealth is the proper focal point of
corporate activity.”160
VII. Conclusion
Few developments in the legal academy have been as
influential as that of the law and economics movement. And there
are few fields that have been more affected by this movement than
that of corporate law.
Although law and economics has shed incredible light upon
many legal problems, and provided powerful analytical tools with
which to examine the law, it has, unfortunately, contributed to a
view of the corporation that is entirely economic in nature.161 It has
helped propel a contractarian understanding of the corporation,

158. Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of Corporate Responsibility, supra note 42,
at 958.
159. Johnson, Delaware Judiciary, supra note 27, at 876.
160. Id. at 882.
161. See Colombo, The Naked Private Square, supra note 29, at 13 (“Title VII
famously prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, race,
or natural origin . . . . [It] forbade employers from making employment decision
on the basis of religion . . . .”).
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and with it an understanding of corporate purpose defined
narrowly as profit maximization for shareholder benefit.162
There are, and have always been, competing theories of the
corporation. These include perspectives that are more
communitarian in nature, and that stress the concept of corporate
social responsibility.163 Such theories have, however, largely failed
to gain much traction in recent times.164 In years past, however,
these theories have had their day.165 Recognizing the corporation’s
purpose as fundamentally religious in nature can reclaim much of
this discarded past. For with this recognition would come a deeper,
richer understanding of corporate fiduciary duties. It would also
provide a principled justification (which has thus far proven
elusive) for greater corporate social responsibility. This, in turn,
would empower officers and directors to take such responsibility
more seriously.
Although a religious conceptualization of corporate purpose
would admittedly take many by surprise, a careful review of the
corporation reveals that such a conceptualization is justifiable if
not unavoidable. Arguably more influential than even the nation
state in modern times,166 the business corporation is the means by
which vast numbers of people satisfy their myriad needs and
desires. It is within their place of corporate employment that
countless workers spend most of their waking hours.167 It is
162. See id. at 15 (“As a result of [Title VII and the Worker Freedom acts],
‘people had incorrectly assumed that it was illegal to practice any form of religious
expression in the workplace.’”).
163. See Millon, Crisis in Corporate Law, supra note 92, at 1378 (explaining
the communitarian belief that corporate law should confront the harmful effects
on non-shareholder constituencies through the managerial pursuit of shareholder
wealth maximization).
164. See id. at 1376 (“[A]dvocates for shareholder interests have not
abandoned the field. They have returned to the fray, reinvigorated by recent
developments in the corporate world.”).
165. See id. at 1375 (“Hostile takeovers, which seemed to promise so much for
shareholders, ended up raising serious doubts about the shareholder primacy
norm that was their strongest justification.”).
166. Indeed, many corporations are undeniably far more influential and
powerful than many national governments. See Colombo, The Naked Private
Square, supra note 29, at 49 (“[M]edieval corporations, and practically all
corporations up until the mid-nineteenth century, concerned themselves with
undertakings such as education, religion, colonization, foreign trade,
bridge-building, hospital maintenance, and other public-oriented activities.”).
167. See id. at 20 (“An individual’s development as a human being, on a
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therefore no exaggeration to claim that for untold numbers of
individuals, their very salvation will turn upon the decisions they
make with respect to the corporations they work for, invest in, or
transact business with. An entity with such influence and power,
and that touches the lives of virtually every human being, is an
entity that demands scrutiny under the world’s various religious
traditions. And once applied, most religious traditions will quickly
realize that not only corporate activity, but even the very purpose
of the business corporation is unavoidably religious in nature in
that that it serves as a critical means by which so many individuals
pursue their ultimate end.

variety of levels, can very well occur largely within the context of their
employment and careers.”).

